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Collective Bargaining and Inflation 
George Saunders 
Pending the results of such further research it can only 
be concluded at this juncture that, given the nature of the 
Canadian economy and the System of wage détermination, 
there is no reason to believe that the contribution of col-
lective bargaining to récent price developments was any 
greater than that of other factors in the inflationary 
process. 
This paper considers the rôle of collective bargaining in the develop-
ment of inflation in Canada. The paper is confined to the question 
cf whether collective bargaining has recently been pushing up wages 
and hence costs and priées. It vvill not be eoneerned with the issue of 
the use of collective bargaining as an instrument of government policy 
to help control wage inflation, a matter which is implicit in the wage 
policies of several western countries. 
For purposes of the paper, it is assumed that the présent 
period of rising priées can be characterized as a period of infla-
tion. This assumption may be questioned since it is doubtful 
whether price rises of 3.5 to 4.5% per year, which has been the 
récent expérience, could fit a définition of inflation. However, 
a continuation of this trend is serious, (the Economie Council has 
stated that an acceptable rate of price increase is about 2% per 
year), and it is this aspect of 
the présent situation which gi-
ves justification to concern about 
wage and price behaviour in this 
country. 
* The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily 
reflect the thinking or policy of the Task Force of the Department of Labour. 
The paper is based on a talk given to the Second Annual Meeting of the Profes-
sionaî Institute of the Public Service of Alberta, Edmonton, February 17, 1968. 
Thanks are due Professor John Crispo for his helpful comments and George Jaycox 
for his assistance on the statistics and footnotes. 
SAUNDERS, GEORGE, Research Di-
rector of the Task Force on Labour 
Relations and Director of the Econo-
mies and Research Branch of the Ca-
nada Department of Labour, Ottawa. 
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The rôle of collective bargaining in récent wage and price behaviour 
can be examined by a test of the six propositions listed below. It is hoped 
that this test will contribute to the establishment of a sound method for 
considering the degree to which collective bargaining can be blamed 
for inflation. 
1. Collective bargaining is widespread so that its effects can be 
felt nationally; 
2. Collective bargaining is centralized, thus permitting wage set-
tlements to be applied uniformly on a national scale or in some 
other national rational manner, regardless of différences in 
abilities or needs among industries and companies; 
3. Pattern bargaining, that is, the imitation of collective bargaining 
settlements, is widespread; 
4. Récent wage settlements are inflationary in their effects; 
5. Large wage increases are restricted to the union sector only; 
6. In gênerai, collective bargaining plays a major rôle in deter-
mining the course of the business cycle and the shape of éco-
nomie events. 
Collective Bargaining is Widespread 
In Canada, this is far from the case. There are about ll/2 million 
workers in the Canadian labour force and less than two million (or 
about one-quarter) are members of trade unions.1 Most of thèse 
workers belong to unions in the blue collar sectors of manufacturing, 
forestry, construction, utilities, mining and transportation. * Very little 
organization is found in service, trade and finance or among the white 
collar, professional, scientific, and technical occupations, although in 
récent years a growing proportion of thèse workers, particularly public 
servants and certain professional occupations such as nurses, teachers 
and engineers, are participating in a form of collective bargaining as 
a method of setting their wages and working conditions. Thus, for the 
large majority of Canadian workers, wages and working conditions are 
determined outside of the traditional collective bargaining process. 
(1) Canada Department of Labour, Labour Organizations in Canada, 1967, 56th 
Edition, Annual, Ottawa. 
(2) Canada Department of Labour, Industrial and Géographie Distribution of 
Union Membership in Canada in 1967, Labour Gazette, February 1968, p. 91. 
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Collective Bargaining is Centralized 
This is certainly not the case in Canada. Collective bargaining is 
decentralized at the level of the plant or company.3 Wage décisions 
made at this level are arrived at independendy. There is no centralized 
System of collective bargaining as is found in certain other countries 
such as Sweden, nor is there a system of national coordination of wage 
décisions. 
Unions in this country are not united for purposes of collective 
bargaining. Each union enjoys complète independence of action in 
the conduct of its affairs. It controis its own finances; makes its own 
décisions concerning discipline of union members, strikes and the for-
mulation of collective bargaining policies; conducts its own negotiations; 
and administers its own agreements. To promote common interests, 
however, Canadian unions hâve joined together into loose fédérations 
— the major fédérations being the Canadian Labour Congress, to which 
about three-quarters of ail union members are affiliated, and the Con-
fédération of National Trade Unions, to which approximately 11% of 
union members, virtually ail of them in the Province of Québec, are 
affiliated. 
The Canadian Labour Congress lias no légal power over its affiliâtes 
and takes virtually no part in collective bargaining. It acts rather as 
a clearing house for information, undertakes research, assists affiliâtes 
in organizing and takes an active rôle in political activity. The amount 
of influence it can exert over affiliated unions is dépendent on its 
prestige and the support it receives from member unions. 
For purposes of collective bargaining, each union comprises a 
network of locals. Thèse local unions usually hâve as members workers 
of individual establishments or sorne other defined local unit such as 
a community or part of a community. Although most unions in Canada 
are part of international unions with headquarters in the United States 
(almost three-quarters of ail union members in Canada belong to inter-
national unions), their locals usually enjoy greater autonomy than their 
U.S. counterparts. In a study of union agreements on file in the Canada 
(3) GEORGE SAUNDERS, Wage Détermination in Canada, Occasional Paper No. 3, 
Canada Department of Labour, Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1965, p. 7. Much of the 
material in this section is taken from this publication. 
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Department of Labour, it was found that between 70 and 80% of ail 
union agreements in Canada covering about the same percentage of 
ail workers under agreement, are negotiated between individual union 
locals and individual employers. The extent to which the local surrenders 
authority over bargaining is often more a décision of the local than of 
the national or international union as such. 
On the employer side, there is even a greater degree of decen-
tralization. Each company has sole responsibility for its industrial 
relations and personnel policies. Many companies belong to associations 
but thèse associations, in the main, exercise no control over company 
policies. A few employer associations bargain on behalf of member 
companies but where this occurs it is restrieted geographically to cities. 
provinces or régions. 
Aside from the structure of labour and management organizations, 
it would, in any event, be difficult to hâve coordinated bargaining 
because of the decentralization of political authority over labour matters 
and the principles governing the certification of bargaining units. 
Jurisdiction over collective bargaining is divided among 11 différent 
governments, the 10 provincial governrnenls and the fédéral government. 
The fédéral government has responsibility for less than 10% of the 
labour force, the remaining 90% or more corne under provincial juris-
diction. Each jurisdiction has its own labour relations législation. 
Although this législation is generally similar in most jurisdictions, there 
are sufficient différences to discourage nation-wide or even region-wide 
coordination of collective bargaining in most industries. It is significant 
that the most successful example of nation-wide collective bargaining 
is in the railway industry which is under the jurisdiction of the fédéral 
government. 
The certification process, that is, the process by which unions are 
legally recognized to bargain collectively, encourages bargaining at the 
level of the plant. To be certified, unions are required to demonstrate 
on application that the majority of the non-supervisory workers in a 
unit are bona fide members of the union. Détermination of the unit is 
•i décision of labour relations boards established under the législation. 
Invariably thèse boards décide in terms of the producing unit, that is, 
the individual plant or part of a plant, basically following tradition 
and practice in the plant. Bargaining nuits extending beyond a reco-
gnized producing unit are not numerous and usually require the consent 
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of the employer or employers and unions involved before the boards 
will décide in favour of such units. The récognition and certification 
cf a bargaining unit mean that bargaining negotiations involving multi-
units are difficult without the agreement of both parties to such bar-
gaining. The collective agreement carefully spells out in détail the unit 
and the employées in the unit affected by the terms of the agreement. 
Patrern Bargaining is Widespread 
Although multi-employer or industry-wide bargaining is rare in 
this country, the objectives of such bargaining can be achieved by the 
spread of settlements negotiated in « key » sectors. This phenomenon 
is called pattern bargaining and in Canada it is not widespread. An 
examination of statistics on negotiated settlements published regularly 
by the Economies and Research Branch of the Canada Department of 
Labour shows very little wage uniformity in collectively bargained 
agreements. * Negotiated wage settlements vary from plant to plant, 
industry to industry, and area to area. 
For example, in 1966 wage increases on base rates of labourers 
concluded in large negotiating units (that is, units covering 500 or more 
employées) ranged from as low as 4% to as high as 71% over the life 
of the contract, which means two or three years in most contacts.5 
There was no one settlement which could be referred to as setting a 
pattern. Even the so-called « Pearson formula » of 30% in the seaway 
settlement could not be identified as setting a pattern, nor the 18% 
wage increase (which subsequently was revised to 24%) for railway 
workers. 
It may be recalled that the settlement in the seaway dispute, which 
provided for a 30% increase in base rates for seaway workers over a 
two-year period, was labelled as a government settlement (hence the 
term « Pearson formula » ) and consequently was hailed by many as 
giving labour officiai sanction to ask for 30% increases in their wages. 
The 18% settlement in the railway industry was also thought to be 
important for settlements elsewhere because of the position of the 
(4) Canada Department of Labour, Collective Bargaining Review, Supplément 
to Labour Gazette. Also see Canada Department of Labour, The Behaviour of 
Canadian Wages and Salaries in the Postwar Period, November 1967, Table 12. 
(5) Canada Department of Labour, Collective Bargaining Review, Supplément 
to Labour Gazette, January 1967. 
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railway industry in this country. However, in fact, as noted there was 
a wide variation in settlements in this period. Most of the settlements 
were below 20% over the life of the contract. This is not to deny that 
« key » settlements did not exercise some influence on the size of other 
settlements. There is little information on this matter and it is one 
vvhich requires additional research. The statistics only tell us the 
extent to which similar terms are being bargained in various wage 
negotiations across the country. 
Again, in the first half of 1967, wage increases on base rates pro-
vided for in major contracts also showed wide variations. In percentage 
terms, increases varied from 3% to 44% over the life of the contract.6 
More than one-half the contracts provided for increases of less than 
20%, a fifth of them gave increases ranging between 21% and 
30% and the remainder gave more than 30%. 
It may be argued that this variation is to be expected since contracts 
of varying lengths are being combined in the statistics. That this 
argument does not hold can be seen from the variation in wage increases 
provided for in 1967 in one-year contracts and in longer-term contracts 
signed in 1967. 
Increases on base rates in major negotiation units to take effect in 
1967 varied from as low as 3% to as high as 30%.7 About one-half of 
the contracts gave increases of less than 10%, nearly one-half were in 
the 10% to 20% range and the remainder were above 20%. Thèse 
variations are as large within industries as among industries. For 
example, within forestry, 5 two-year major contracts were negotiated 
in the first half of 1967 and the wage increases provided varied from 
20% to 41% over the life of the contract. In manufacturing, 21 three-
year contracts gave increases varying from 9% to 31% over the life of 
the contract. Thèse increases were spread over this range without any 
significant clustering. Similar variations are noted for other industries. 
There is, thus, little uniformity in wage behaviour in major nego-
tiations that take place in collective bargaining across the country. 
Exceptions to this rule, however, can be found in automobiles, can 
(6 ) Canada Department of Labour, Collective Bargaining Review, Supplément 
to Labour Gazette, July 1967. 
(7 ) Ihid. 
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manufacturing, steel, looging, méat packing and pulp and paper in 
which key settlements are usually followed from company to company 
within each of thèse industries but, with the possible exception of méat 
packing and can manufacturing, only within a spécifie géographie area 
such as a région or province. Pattern bargaining in méat packing is 
often nation-wide and in can manufacturing settlements in the two large 
companies are signed in the United States for ail of North America. 
There are various reasons why pattern bargaining is not more 
widespread in Canada. Certainly the press, radio and TV coverage of 
large settlements cannot but help influence union wage demands in 
various parts of the country and there is no doubt such demands do 
reflect wage developments elsewhere. However, what is demanded 
and what is settled are two entirely différent things. The geographical 
dispersement of Canada and its population, the cultural and language 
différences between Québec and the rest of the country, the geographical 
concentration of production and the international outlook of many 
Canadian industries are important factors working against national wage 
uniformity. Wage trends in British Columbia hâve little relevance for 
wage trends in the Maritime Provinces, some three thousand miles away. 
There is little relationship between pulp and paper settlements in 
British Columbia and settlements in this industry in Québec and Ontario. 
The north-south pull of the United States is a very important consi-
dération in the identification of wage trends in différent parts of the 
country as opposed to trends east and west. 
Another important factor which affects the degree of pattern bar-
gaining in this country is the fixed terni of collective agreements. Once 
signed, a collective agreement generally cannot be reopéned until the 
expiry date even though, in the meantime, économie conditions might 
hâve changed radically or important settlements hâve taken place 
elsewhere. The increasing incidence of long-term agreements has 
widened the time span among expiry dates in various contracts, tending 
to resuit in further dilution in the spread of similar terms of settlement. 
A key agreement signed two or three years ago would hâve very little 
influence on the terms of settlement in agreements signed today. 
Récent Wage Settlements are Inflationary 
During the past two years there hâve been a number of very large 
wage settlements. The size of thèse settlements has given rise to concern 
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about their inflatibnary effect, especially in sectors where compétitive 
forces are weak. Thèse sectors include certain firms which aie essential 
to the public welfare such as in air, rail, truck and water transportation 
and firms which enjoy monopolistic or oligopoliste market positions. 
In thèse sectors it is argiied that collective bargaining in the usual sensé 
does not opérate effectively since employers hâve considérable room 
for passing the costs of wage settlements on to the consumer in the 
form of higher priées (or higher taxes), especially in periods of high 
économie activity. 
However, in assessing thèse settlements it should be noted that in 
thèse monopolistic and public-sector areas a large number of the 
employées who had been able to negotiate large wage increases during 
this period had previously negotiated contracts three or four years ago 
before the current period of accelerated price increases and high levels 
of économie activity. Thus, in much of what was negotiated it may 
simply be that thèse employées are catching up. The effect of their 
settlements on costs may be a conséquence, therefore, of the timing 
of thèse increases rather than their size. This is one of the priées the 
parties pay for the peaceful and stabilized relationships which long-term 
agreements give them. 
Unfortunately, there is little information to assess the impact of 
long term agreements on wage trends. In a spécial investigation cur-
rently underway in the Economies and Research Branch of the Canada 
Department of Labour, it is being found that workers under long-term 
contracts are not obtaining as large annual wage increases as those 
under one-year agreements. For example, three-year contracts signed 
in 1964 gave relatively large wage increases but thèse increases were 
barely enough to keep up with wage increases provided for in one-year 
contracts signed over the three years 1964, 1965 and 1966. In the three-
year contracts, which covered negotiating units of 500 or more workers, 
the average wage increase amounted to 24 cents per hour on base rates. 
In contrast, the one-year contracts covering negotiating units of 
similar size gave in total 26.5 cents per hour over the three years. 
Similar results are noted in a comparison of two-year contracts with 
one-year contracts, that is, workers working under two-year contracts 
signed in 1964 and 1965 were slightly worse off than workers under 
one-year contracts signed over the 1964 to 1966 period. According to 
thèse statistics, therefore, long-term agreements may hâve the effect of 
holding down wages in an upswing and this, in turn, results in large 
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wage demands at the expiry date to catch up and make provision for 
the following contract period. 
Large Wage Increases are Restricted to the Union Sector Only 
Statistics do not support this assertion. For example, between 
October 1964 and October 1967, average weekly wages and salaries 
increased by almost 17% in finance and 23% in service, two large 
non-union sectors, and by 18% in transportation and public utilities, 
19% in forestry, 20% in manufacturing, and about 22% in mining, 
four heavily unionized sectors.8 
Again, in this same period, white collar workers, who are not nearly 
as unionized as their blue collai' counterparts, experienced increases in 
their salaries which were equal to or above wage increases received 
by blue collar workers. For example, in manufacturing, average weekly 
wages of blue collar workers rose some 18% between October 1964 
and October 1967.9 Average weekly wages and salaries (separate data 
on average weekly salaries are not available) on the other hand rose, 
as indicated above, by 20%. Similar results are noted for other major 
sectors: the figures are, in mining, 22% for both wages and salaries; 
in construction, 35% for both catégories of figures; and in hôtels and 
restaurants, 14% for average weekly wages and salaries and 10% for 
average weekly wages. 
This relative behaviour of wages and salaries between union and 
non-union workers is not new. Indeed, for the past 15 years or more 
the pay of large numbers of non-union workers has been keeping pace 
with or exceeding that of many unionized workers. For example, 
between 1953 and 1966, average weekly wages and salaries of em-
ployées in predominantly non-union finance and service increased by 
80% and 89%, respectively. In the same period, average weekly wages 
and salaries in the predominantly unionized sectors rose by only 68% 
in transportation and public utilities, 6Q% in manufacturing, 74% in 
mining, and 80% in forestry. Similarly, salaries of white collar workers 
during this period hâve been rising at a faster rate than wages of blue 
(8) Calculations based on data from Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Employment 
and Payrolls (Catalogue No. 72-002), Monthly, October 1964 and October 1967. 
(9) Based on data from Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Man-Hours and Hourly 
Earnings with Average Weekly Wages (Catalogue No. 72-003), Monthly, October 
1964 and October 1967. 
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collar workers. Whereas average weekly wages and salaries between 
1953 and 1966 rose some 57% in hôtels and restaurants, 69% in manu-
facturing, 74% in mining, and 98%) in construction i0, average weekly 
wages of blue collar workers in thèse sectors increased by only 38% in 
hôtels and restaurants, 63% in manufacturing u , 68% in mining, and 
9Q% in construction 12. 
Thèse data simply reflect the opération of demand and supply 
forces. For example, finance and service hâve both undergone rapid 
expansion during the past 15 years and this is reflected in the growth of 
their émployment relative to other industrial catégories. Employment in 
finance and service increased by 84% and 196%, respectively, in the 
1953-66 period, whereas in manufacturing, mining, forestry and trans-
portation and public utilities, employment increases were only 29%, 
15%, 6% and 50%, respectively. 
Thèse wage trends between union and non-union sectors are further 
confirmed by a comparison between the salaries of professional occu-
pations and wages for certain blue collar classes. Data for this comparison 
are available for the 1958 and 1963 period only. Between thèse two 
years, increases in the salary rates of engineers and scientists varied 
between 16% and 35%. Most of the occupations experienced increases 
of 20% or more l s . On the other hand, wage rates for labourers in 
(10) Based on data from Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Review of Employment 
and Payrolîs, Annual, 1964, (Catalogue No. 72-201) and Émployment and Average 
Weekly Wages and Salaries, Monthly, Mardi 1968, (Catalogue No. 72-002). For 
transportation and public utilities, 1953 data are calculated from the 1953 monthly 
Employment and Payroll bulletins and for hôtels and restaurants, data are from 
October 1953 nd October 1966 Employment and Payroll bulletins. 
(11) It is interesting to note in this connection that weekly wage increases in 
manufacturing are not far out of Une with productivity increases. Over the period 
1953-66, output per manhour in manufacturing increased by 64% and output per 
person employed rose by 60%. See Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Aggregate Pro-
ductivity Trends, 1946-66, (Catalogue No. 14-201), Annual. There are no separate 
productivity figures for other catégories such as mining, construction, etc. However, 
output per person employed (output per manhour figures are in brackets) increases 
for the commercial sector as a whole in the 1953-66 period amounted to 48% (63%), 
in the non-agricultural goods-producing sector, 64% (71.6%), in non-manufacturing 
(commercial non-agriculture) 30% (42.7%), and in commercial service-producing, 
16% (25.7%). 
(12) Data from Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Review of Manhours and Hourly 
Earnings, Annual, 1964, (Catalogue No. 72-202) and Manhours and Hourly Earnings, 
Monthly, March 1968, (Catalogue No. 72-003). 
(13) Canada Department of Labour, Employment and Earnings in the Scientific 
and Technical Professions, 1958-61, Report No. 12, September 1962, and Annual 
Earnings in the Scientific and Technical Professions, 1963, Professional Manpower 
Bulletin, No. 6, July 1964. 
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Toronto and Montréal rose between 8 and 15%, and for certain blue 
collar skilled workers in thèse two cities, between 15 and 19% in the 
same period14. This resuit is to be expected considering the very rapid 
expansion in the employment of highly trained manpower during the 
postwar period as compared to labourers and other blue collar occu-
pations. 
The statistics in this section relate to a comparison of wage increases 
in rapidly expanding non-union sectors with increases in predominently 
unionized sectors. It might be added parenthetically (lest the wrong 
impression left) that there are large sectors of non-union workers who 
hâve not done as well as thèse workers. For example, wages and salaries 
in trade, a large non-union area, did not increase nearly as rapidly as did 
wages and salaries in the sectors described above. To ilîustrate, between 
October 1964 and October 1967, average weekly wages and salaries in 
trade rose only 11%, which is well below the increases recorded in this 
period in ail other major sectors. Again, between 1953 and 1966, the 
wage and salary increases in trade amounted to only 58%, also the 
smallest rise of ail the major sectors. 
Unions Shope the Course of Business Cycles and Economie Events 
Again, statistics do not support this contention. Wage behaviour 
has an historical relationship to the business cycle. This relationship 
is observed currently in both the union and non-union sectors and has 
been observed in the so-called non-union periods of the past. It is 
traditionally the case for wages increases to begin to accelerate as the 
peak of the business cycle is neared.13 It is also at this time that the 
rate of increase in profits and productivity begins to fall and unit costs 
rise. In typical business cycles, profits and productivity rise rapidly 
at the beginning of the upswing whereas wage and cost increases 
accelerate towards the end of the expansion. For example, in the récent 
period of expansion beginning in 1961, corporation profits before taxes 
in ail industries rose by 10.5% between 1961 and 1962, 4.4% between 
1962 and 1963, 14.6% between 1963 and 1964, 13.5% between 1964 
(14) Canada Department of Labour, Wage Rates, Salaries and Hours of Labour, 
Annual, Report No. 41, 1958, Tables 88 and 89 and Report No. 46, 1963, Tables 
90 and 92. 
(15) Economie Council of Canada, Third Annual Review, Priées, Productivity and 
Employment, November 1966, pp. 42 and 98-99. 
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and 1965, and then fell off to a .2% décline between 1965 and 1966.16 
Output per man hour in commercial non-agricultural industries showed 
a similar rate of advance, that is, increasing more rapidly in the early 
1960's than in the mid-1960's.17 Wages and priées, on the other hand, 
showed a reverse trend, that is, they increased at a more rapid rate 
during the latter part of the 1961-68 period than in the earlier part.18 
It was not until 1966 that labour regained the share of total income it 
held nine years earlier in 1957.19 
The extent to which wage behaviour is controlled by the économie 
environment is further evidenced in a comparison of wage trends in the 
long period of stable priées between 1958 and 1964 and the most récent 
period of expansion. In the former period, average weekly wages 
and salaries for ail industry rose about 3^2% per year which was well 
within the limits of reasonable price stability. Priées in this period 
rose at a rate of only 1 to \yi°/o per year. Since 1964, wage and salary 
increases hâve accelerated and are now increasing at a rate of about 
6% per year, and priées between 3y2% to 4}4% annually. 
(16) Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Corporation Profits (Catalogue No. 61-003), 
Quarterly. Figures are annual averages. 
(17) Annual increases in output per manhour in commercial non-agriculture 
industries are as follows : 
Year Year 
1960-61 2.4 1963-64 3.0 
1961-62 2.9 1964-65 2.5 
1962-63 3.1 1965-66 . . . . . 1.8 
Source : Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Aggregate Productivité/ Trends 1946-66, 
p. 22. 
(18) For example, average weeldy wages and salaries and priées increased as 
follows : 
Weekly Wages and Salaries Consumer Price Index 
îndustrial Composite Manufacturing 
1960-61 3.1 3.2 0.9 
1961-62 3.1 3.0 1.2 
1962-63 3.5 3.7 1.8 
1963-64 3.9 4.0 1.8 
1964-65 5.0 5.6 2.4 
1965-66 5.8 5.6 3.7 
Oct. 1966-Oct. 67 5.7 6.2 3.6 
Source : Data from Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Employment and Payrolîs various 
issues and Prices and Price Indexes, May 1968. 
(19) Dominion Bureau of Statistics, National Accounts, Income and Expenditure, 
(Catalogue No. 13-201), Annual, 1962 and 1967. 
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This resuit is repeated over and over again at the industrial, occu-
pational, company and régional levels.20 That is, wages ïncreasef aster 
in expanding industries, occupations, companies and régions than they 
do in declining sectors. The statistics quoted throughout this paper 
confirm this finding. 21 The rapid growth of finance, service, construc-
tion and public utilities is reflected in pay advances in thèse industries 
which hâve outpaced pay increases in such industries as manufacturing, 
mining and trade, which hâve not grown as rapidly. In the same vein, 
average weekly wages and salaries rose less in the less prosperous 
Atlantic région than in British Columbia or Québec, both of which 
experienced rapid économie growth relative to the Atlantic area during 
the past 15 years. Finally, as noted earlier, salaries of highly trained 
manpower hâve been rising at a much f aster raté than wages of blue 
collar workers, reflecting the rapidly increasing demand for their services 
relative to those of manual workers. 
Thèse changes in the structure of wages and employment in the 
Canadian economy are currently reflected in wide différences in wage 
levels across industries, areas and occupations, with the highest wages 
being found in high productivity sectors and the lowest wages in low 
productivity sectors. Différences in wage levels in Canada are con-
sidered large by international standards. In 1965, wages and salaries 
in Canadian industry averaged about $91.00 per week. In the lowest 
paid sector, service, the average was approximately $66.00, which was 
about 40% lower than wages and salaries in the highest paid sector, 
namely, mining, which had average weekly wages and salaries of 
$112.00. A similar variation occurs on a geographical basis. Weekly 
wages and salaries in Prince Edward Island averaged $62.00 and in 
British Columbia, $101.00. Within manufacturing, the highest wage 
industry has a wage level more than double that of the lowest wage 
manufacturing industry; wage differentials between skilled and unskilled 
workers within the same industry often amount to 50% and in some 
instances even 100%. 
(20) Detailed évidence can be found in an examination of the eârnings data in 
the monthly Dominion Bureau of Statistics reports on Employment and Payrolls 
and Manhour and Hourly Eârnings; in the wage seulement data in the monthly 
Labour Gazette of the Canada Department of Labour; and in the annual Canada 
Department of Labour reports on Wage Rates, Salaries and Hours of Labour. 
(21) Also see Canada Department of Labour, The Behaviour of Canadian Wages 
and Salaries in the Postwar Period, op. cit. ; H.D. WOODS and SYLVJA OSTRY, 
Labour Policy and Labour Economies in Canada, MâcMulan of Canada, Toronto, 
1962, Chapters XIV to XVII ; and GEORGE SAUNDERS, op. cit. 
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The significance of market forces in Canadian wage behaviour has 
been the main thrust of most studies of wages in Canada.S2 Thèse 
studies indicate or imply that collective bargaining has, at best, a minor 
rôle to play in wage setting, especially in ternis of raising wages to a 
point where it has a significant impact on costs. Wages are shown to 
be more closely correlated with employment, priées, profits and pro-
ductivity than with unionism. We may find a high corrélation between 
the extent of collective bargaining and wages, but this may be because 
unionism tends to be concentrated in highly productive, high wage-
paying industries. There are numerous examples of highly organized 
industries, such as clothing and textiles, in which wages are low com-
pared to those of other equally well organized industries, such as 
automobiles and steel. In addition, there are a number of poorly union-
ized industries, such as petroleum and refining, paying some of the 
highest wages in the country.2â One eminent author in the United 
States who undertook a study of wage structures in a number of countries 
concluded as follows for Canada: 
c The Canadian case is one of a young and rapidly expanding economy, 
with large shifts occurring in the composition of labour demand and 
an unusual degree of decentralization and freedom in wage differentials 
of every type, and one would also expect rapid shiftings of differ-
entials prompted mainly by labour demand and supply developments. 
The fact that events seem to accord closely with thèse a priori expecta-
tions suggests that économie théories of wage détermination retain a 
high degree of usefulness in analysing libéral économies of the 
Canadian sort. » 24 
Summary and Conclusion 
In summary, based on the évidence presented in this paper, five of 
the six propositions examined failed to stand up to close scrutiny. The 
(22) See for example: H.D. WOODS and SYLVIA OSTRY, op. cit.; S.F. KALISKX, 
c The Relation Between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wages 
in Canada », International Economie Review, January 1964 ; JOHN VANDERKAMP, 
« Wage and Price Level Détermination — An Empirical Model for Canada », 
Economica, May 1966 ; R.G. BODKIN, E.P. BOND, G.L. REUBER, T.R. ROBINSON, 
Price Stability and High Employment, The Options for Canadian Economie Policy, 
Economie Council of Canada Spécial Study No. 5, 1967 ; L.G. REYNOLDS and 
C. TAFT, Evolution of Wage Structure, Yale University Press, 1956 ; Organization for 
Economie Co-operation and Development, Wages and Labour Mohility, JParis 1965 ; 
and GEORGE SAUNDERS, Wages and Costs in Canadian Industry, in U.S. Department 
of Labor and State of Florida, Wage, Price and Productivity Statistics, June 1964. 
(23) See W.R. DYMOND and GEORGE SAUNDERS, Hours of Work in Canada, in 
Industrial Relations Research Association Publication, No. 32A, Hours of Work, 
editors Clyde E. Dankert, Floyd C. Mann and Herbert R. Northrup. 
(24) L.G. REYNOLDS and C. TAFT, op. cit., p. 315. 
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remaining proposition, « récent wage settlements are inflationary in their 
effects », contains some élément of truth. Récent wage settlements 
hâve been large and could be potentially inflationary in their impact. 
But because they hâve been in long-term contracts for the most part, 
the impact may be more a function of the timing of the wage increases 
granted in thèse contracts rather than in their size. It was shown that 
over time the size of settlements in long-term contracts are no greater 
(and, in fact, may be less) than settlements in short-term contracts. 
The analysis, therefore, strongly suggests that collective bargaining 
is not an independent nor primary factor in initiating the récent period 
of rising priées. Wages in the unionized sector, as in the non-unionized 
sector, are strongly determined by the opération of market forcés.£5 
Collective bargaining follows économie activity rather than leads it. 
Less settled is the question of the rôle of collective bargaining in 
maintaining, spreading and perhaps accelerating inflation once a period 
of rising priées begins. The évidence on this is conflicting. On the one 
hand, note was made of the tendency for large wage increases nego-
tiated in the union sector to lag behind changes in other économie 
variables and to be less than the advances in the pay of certain unorga-
nized groups of workers especially those in the professional and scientific 
catégories and those in fast expanding industries faced with extremely 
tight labour markets. On the other hand, the size and timing of thèse 
large negotiated wage settlements undoubtedly affect wage demands 
across the country. The précise impact of this influence cannot be 
determined with presently available information. Also very little is 
known about employer adjustments to rapid increases in wages. More 
research is required on thèse matters. Pending the results of such 
further research it can only be concluded at this juncture that, given the 
(25) Perhaps more so than in most of the other western industrial démocraties 
where collective bargaining is more widespread and more centralized. It is note-
worthy that even in those countries market forces are important. This can be seen 
in the phenomenon of c wage drift » which measures the différence between actual 
changes in workers' wages and wage changes bargained in central negotiations. 
The différence results from employer practices at the plant or company level of 
increasing the pay of their employées above the bargained rate in order to meet 
the pressures of the market. Wage drift has been a particularly vexing problem in 
the Scandinavian countries, Holland and the United Kingdom, where negotiations 
are centralized either at the national or industry level. Similarly, an attempt to 
rationalize wages nationally in the United States via the guiaeline pohcy has 
recently broken down under the pressures of market forces. It is quite clear from the 
statistics quoted in this paper that wage drifts of sizeable proportions would hâve 
taken place in Canada in the last two or three years had unitorm national agree-
ments on wages and salaries been negotiated. 
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nature of the Canadian economy and the system of wage détermination, 
there is no reason to believe that the contribution of collective bar-
baining to récent price developments was any greater than that of other 
factors in the inflationary process. 
LA NÉGOCIATION COLLECTIVE ET L'INFLATION 
Afin d'établir le rôle qu'a joué la négociation collective dans les récentes 
variations des prix et des salaires, nous tenterons de vérifier les six hypothèses 
suivantes : 
1.—la négociation collective a une portée telle qu'on peut ressentir ses effets 
à travers tout le pays ; 
2.—la négociation collective est centralisée permettant ainsi l'application soit 
uniforme, soit d'une autre façon rationnelle à l'échelle nationale des ententes 
salariales qu'elles que soient les différences de moyens ou de besoins entre 
les industries ou les compagnies impliquées ; 
3.—la méthode d'imitation d'une négociation maîtresse est très utilisée ; 
4.—les récentes ententes salariales ont des effets inflationnistes ; 
5.—les augmentations importantes de salaires sont réservées aux secteurs syn-
diqués ; 
6.—de façon générale, la négociation collective joue un rôle prépondérant dans 
la détermination des cycles et des événements économiques. 
Après vérification, nous nous sommes aperçu que, de façon générale, ces hypo-
thèses étaient loin de la réalité. Disons, en premier lieu, qu'environ 25% de la 
main-d'oeuvre voit ses traitements et ses conditions de travail établis par le pro-
cessus traditionnel de négociation collective. En second lieu, nous devons admettre 
que la négociation collective n'est pas centralisée. A quelques exceptions près, les 
décisions dans les négociations collectives sont prises localement, indépendamment 
des décisions prises ailleurs. En troisième lieu, disons que le « pattern bargaining » 
n'existe pas à l'échelle nationale. Ceux qui emploient cette méthode, le font habi-
tuellement pour une région géographique donnée : nous pouvons citer à ce sujet 
l'exemple de l'industrie automobile du sud-ouest ontarien et celle de l'industrie du 
papier dans l'est du pays. 
Les faits ne supportent pas non plus la cinquième hypothèse (les augmenta-
tions de salaires des syndiqués sont plus grandes que celles de travailleurs non 
syndiqués). Les augmentations de traitement de plusieurs travailleurs non-syndiqués 
sont aussi sinon plus importantes que celles du secteur syndiqué. 
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Il y a peu d'informations disponibles pour la vérification de la quatrième hypo-
thèse. Nous nous sommes aperçu que les récentes ententes salariales importantes 
avaient une portée à long terme et qu'elles furent négociées avant la hausse 
actuelle des prix et de l'activité économique. En plus, disons que l'augmentation 
de traitement inclus dans ces ententes représente deux choses différentes : d'abord 
un € rattrapage » puis une clause pour la prochaine période que couvre la con-
vention. Nous pouvons cependant dire qu'il semble que les travailleurs soumis à 
une convention de longue période n'ont pas, durant une période de hausse des 
salaires, un train de vie aussi haut que ceux qui ont affaire à une entente de 
courte période. 
En dernier lieu, une comparaison entre les tendances salariales et les tendances 
des autres variables économiques combinée avec l'information fournie dans cet 
article et les résultats d'études sur la détermination des salaires au Canada démon-
tre que la négociation collective ne façonne pas le cours des événements économi-
ques (6e hypothèse). Les forces du marché sont à la base de la détermination 
des salaires dans notre pays, et dominent les développements de la négociation 
collective. 
Après l'analyse que nous avons faite pour écrire cet article, nous pouvons 
conclure que la négociation collective n'a pas semblé être un facteur primordial 
ou même indépendant dans l'introduction de la récente période d'augmentation 
des prix. En plus, il existe un point encore moins réglé que les autres : c'est la 
question de savoir si la négociation collective a un rôle important à jouer dans le 
maintien, l'étendue ou l'accélération de l'inflation après qu'une hausse des prix 
et de l'activité économique ait été notée. 
Les preuves à ce sujet sont contradictoires. On peut seulement dire, en atten-
dant d'autres recherches que, vu la nature de l'économie canadienne et le processus 
de détermination des salaires, il est difficile d'accepter l'idée que la négociation 
collective a eu, sur le taux d'augmentation des prix une influence plus grande 
que celle des autres facteurs dans le processus inflationniste. 
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